First, politics: Hersh notes that the resignation of Admiral William Fallon from Central Command was "ironic" because his views on Iran were in many ways aligned with the Administration's. I'd go even further. It wasn't simply ironic, it was incredibly stupid and indicative of the Bush Administration's secrecy. That secrecy is, in a lot of respects, counterproductive to our interests and the cause of so much disaster in the past seven and a half years. Fallon agreed that Iran was a huge problem, that they were killing American soldiers in Iraq because they wanted us out and, most importantly, that the Iranian government was being uncooperative. He never ruled out military action against Iran, he simply favored negotiation and diplomacy. This minor disagreement was intensified by his "strong belief in the chain of command" and his wanting to remain informed about operations being planned in his jurisdiction as a military commander. This is absolutely ridiculous. An Admiral wanted to be let in on what was being planned in an area in which misinterpretation and ill-adivsed military actions have caused tremendous instability. I admit to being generally uninformed about the military, but that doesn't seem like a deal breaker at all; on the contrary, being informed should be, uh, important. It's ludicrous to even have to point that out.
The Bush Administration has yet again redefined "conservative" to mean "radical." Hersh mentions the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which articulated the chain of command:
from the President to the Secretary of Defense, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on to the various combatant commanders, who were put in charge of all aspects of military operations, including joint training and logistics. That authority, the act stated, was not to be shared with other echelons of command. But the Bush Administration, as part of its global war on terror, instituted new policies that undercut regional commanders-in-chief; for example, it gave Special Operations teams, at military commands around the world, the highest priority in terms of securing support and equipment. The degradation of the traditional chain of command in the past few years has been a point of tension between the White House and the uniformed military.
In a perfect world, this would be a central issue in the current presidential campaign. Democrats have long been maligned as weak on national security and I WOULD THINK that bringing up that you're not the party who has destroyed the chain of command could go a long way towards contradicting the public impression that the Republicans are the dominant party here. The argument on the other side would be that this shift of judgement is due to the nature of special operations. But that's clearly false. Command over an area of operation should be inviolable. Not to mention how radical a notion the Administration's revamping really is. Obama essentially has the same position as Fallon did. We shouldn't ignore that.
This piece has garnered a lot of deserved attention, most of it laudatory. Blake Hounshell, of FP Passport, is less praising. It's a two paragraph entry, so I'll quote it entirely.
By now, you may have already read Seymour Hersh's latest magnum opus, this time about the Bush administration's alleged "support of the minority Ahwazi Arab and Baluchi groups and other dissident organizations" in order to stir up trouble for Iran. Hersh later explains that one such organization is Jundallah, a Sunni fundamentalist group in Baluchistan near the Pakistan border. "According to [former CIA case officer Robert] Baer and to press reports, the Jundallah is among the groups in Iran that are benefitting from U.S. support," Hersh writes.
One of those press reports is probably this blog post from The Blotter, the ABC News blog that got in such trouble for employing Alexis Debat, a French counterterrorism analyst who misrepresented his resume and faked interviews with Barack Obama and several other public figures. ABC News insists that its reporting was solid, but as journalist Laura Rozen found, that's at least open to question. Pakistan, for one, sharply denied the ABC News story about Jundallah. I'm not sure what other reporting Hersh is citing, but let's just say that it's far from certain the United States is doing what he claims.
Well, Pakistan is slightly unreliable on this, I think. Also, Hounshell admits that it's possible Hersh used another source, so his point is weak on the surface. His last sentence doesn't make sense to me. It may be uncertain if we are funding the Jundallah specifically, but there are other things in the article which Hersh mentions that could corroborate that claim. Also, the revelation about Fallon v. Bush is certainly important. Hounshell shouldn't accuse Hersh of using discredited sources, nor should he claim that Hersh's overall point is simply OMG we're funding terrorists groups. Hersh presented his evidence at the end of the article, but I would argue that his central point is to draw a parallel between this buildup against Iran with the buildup to Iraq by articulating the implications of Fallon's dissent and dismissal and tying that into the known evidence of our involvement in Iran. The buildup to war in Iraq and the current rhetoric about Iran have involved a preset goal that isn't malleable in the face of informed counseling by relevant experts. It's really Hersh who's being cautious, at least for him, in outlying his position.
The bottom line is that it's an excellent article and hopefully will spark further debate.
1 comment:
wow. i think the issue that we are in the phases of a build up like iraq is a good one. perhaps journalists never figured out how to recover from psychological pain of mis-reporting the war.
Why do you think, FP which is generally reasonable would attack Hersh's sources?
To avoid what they think is sensationalism? I hope it doesn't turn into a process debate instead of a substantial one.
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